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GROTIUS NUNC PRO TUNC
A NORMATIVE APPROACH TO WAR: PEACE, WAR AND JUSTICE IN HUGO
GROTIUS (Yasuaki Onuma ed.) Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. xviii +
421 pp.
Reviewed by Alfred P. Rubin*
Under the guidance of Professor Yasuaki Onuma of the University
of Tokyo, a group of seven Japanese experts in international legal
history, assisted by a professional translator, two collaborating scholars,
and a consulting editor, has produced this collection of eleven essays on
the seminal work of Hugo Grotius, De lure Belli ac Pacis (BP), which
was first published in 1625. A final essay by Professor Onuma, not
directly related to BP, explains how 17th century European conceptions
of the nation-state and sovereign equality came to dominate the international legal order, that "[i]t was not naked power alone, but the combination of physical and economic power and the power of ideas, that
consolidated European dominance."' The result is the current international legal order, with its grand ideals of equality and its capacity to
justify domination and misery. Onuma points out, fairly enough, that
criticisms could as well have been directed against the Chinese Confucian ideals or. Islamic notions of "jihad" had they dominated the
current legal order, but that as a matter of history, Europe has defined
"civilization" as we know it, and must have the credit and discredit that
goes with domination.
The eleven chapters that form the direct investigation into the
"original intent" of BP begin with an essay by the late Tadashi Tanaka
(Professor of International Law, Daito Bunka University) on what he
calls "Grotius's Method." In dealing with Grotius's concept of "law,"
the essay shows a fundamental break from the Roman Catholic scholastic philosophers' assumptions and a multi-order approach to the question
of what is "just." Under that approach, Grotius considers that "natural
law," "divine volitional law," and the "law of nations" (i.e., the jus
gentium - the laws common to many municipal legal orders and by
analogy to the international legal order) are different legal orders
themselves, each with its own conception of "justice," all of which must
be satisfied before a recourse to "war" can be said to be "just."

* Distinguished Professor of International Law, The Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, Tufts University.
1. A NORMATIVE APPROACH TO WAR: PEACE, WAR, AND JUSTICE IN HUGO GROTIus 378

(Yasuaki Onuma ed., 1993).
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Professor Tanaka carries on this argument in Chapter 2, a detailed
analysis of Grotius's concept of law. It involves picking apart three uses
of the word 'jus" in renaissance Latin writings, as explained by Grotius
himself: jus as "justice" in action, with "justice" being defined as the
absence of "injustice" and injustice being defined as action contrary to
the social nature of man; jus as a moral quality of a person independently of abstractions concerning the "social nature" of mankind as a whole;
and jus as a binding norm, positive law incorporating moral rectitude.
Amoral positive law (human volitional law) is thus dismissed from the
conception of jus (usually translated "law," but so is lex, and the two
Latin words are not the same) as used in Grotius's Latin text. Tanaka's
analysis is technical and not always clear, but then so is Grotius's.
Chapter 3, "War," is by the learned editor of the volume, Yasuaki
Onuma (Professor of International Law, University of Tokyo). Here, too,
is found Grotius's distinction among "natural law," the "law of nations,"
and "divine law," none of which by itself can properly be translated as
"international law." 2 But the bulk of the essay is concerned with
Grotius's notion of "bellumjustum," which depends on the justice of the
causes of war: defense of legal rights, restitution of things wrongly
taken or withheld, and punishment of those who have done an injury to
the party resorting to war. 3 It is notable that war is not justifiable to
right a wrong in the abstract; Wars of "liberation" are not necessarily
"just" if slavery was legitimately caused, as by punishment for an earlier
fault. It could-have been argued that restitution of "liberty" as a property
right might have justified a war of liberation, but Grotius did not go that
far, and his defense of the Dutch wars of independence from Spain
during his lifetime was based on denial of Spanish rights to the degree
that the Spanish assertions rested on divine law pretexts. Grotius, like
the Catholic jurists Vitoria and Suarez before him, considered divine law
to be the order that governs religious matters but not to be binding with
regard to secular matters. Thus, to Grotius, divine law could import no
right to govern property or limit individual liberty. Grotius also denied
Spanish assertions of a right to rule when premised on natural law
notions about the "good of the ruled." By the law of nature as understood by Grotius, no person can be by nature a slave, and thus the
application of Spanish positive law in the Netherlands, to the degree it
deprived Dutch people of their natural liberty, violated natural law.

2. A NORMATIVE APPROACH TO WAR, supra note 1, at 121.

3. Id. at 78-79.

Spring 1995]

Peace, War and Justice in Hugo Grotius

Chapter 4, "State and Governing Power," is by the author of
Chapters 1 and 2, Professor Tanaka. The most interesting part of the
chapter is the clear exposition of Grotius's difficulty in denying a right
of resistance to unjust rule, preferring peace as ordained by the law of
nature and divine law to the breakup of civil society, even though civil
society, being based on human law, can be changed by superseding
human law. Grotius was a loyal Dutchman and Protestant, however,
politically bound to support the revolt of the Netherlands against the
hereditary and divine law rights of the King of Spain. Therefore, he
grounded his support for that rebellion in denying that it was a rebellion
under human law, instead categorizing it as a war of secession based on
necessity under the law of nature and divine law.. This chapter also
introduces Grotius's distinctions between "imperium" and "dominium."
A detailed discussion of those complex notions forms the majority
of Chapter 5 by Masaharu Yanagihara (Professor of International Law,
Kyushu University). In the period when theories of an implied social
contract were replacing the literal contracts of feudalism as the intellectual basis for authority, the distinctions between property rights
(dominium) and abstract authority (imperium) were even less clear than
they are today. Feudal imperium rested on dominium. To Grotius,
dominium implied rights over things (property rights) and imperium
rights over people. There is some sense in this. But in some cases, such
as the rights of parents over children and husbands over wives, natural
law as expounded by Aristotle implied elements of dominium. Also, as
the right to legislate began to be conceived as based on territory, including the territorial and other seas, the overlap of conceptions seemed to
lie at the root of many international disputes.
It is perhaps because of unclarities in Grotius's own thought that I
found this chapter probably the least satisfying in the book. For example, there seems to be a contradiction between the assertion that Grotius categorized the sea as by nature not subject to dominium 4 and the
assertion that imperium can be acquired over parts of the sea by occupation.5 If imperium can be acquired, cannot the exercise of the lawmaking authority of the imperatorcreate dominium in whatever persons
the law-maker chooses to designate as holders of property rights within
that area of imperium? Professor Yanagihara seems unduly deferential to
those who would try to harmonize Grotius's argumentative juvenile tract
on freedom of the seas with his more mature views expressed in BP..

4. Id. at 149 n.18.
5. Id. at 153.
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Chapter 6, "Agreement," by Professor Onuma, deals with Grotius's
concept of the binding force of promises and oaths. Professor Onuma's
analysis is long and detailed, showing Grotius's conception of the
binding force of promises to be qualified by scholastic notions of equity
(aequalitas)and right reason (recta ratio), as parts of natural law, while
oaths are binding because based on divine law.6 Onuma reviews the
writings of many modem scholars to conclude that it is a common error
to read BP as a startlingly modem work. Rather, in historical context
and with some knowledge of Roman law and the legal conceptions of
the time, it can be seen that Grotius was a transitional figure in the
evolution of legal conceptions relating to the bindingness of promises;
he formulated a modem theory based upon traditional notions and patterns of argumentation. In my opinion, Professor Onuma is right.7
Chapter 7, by Terumi Furukawa (Professor of International Law,
Hosei University) is titled "Punishment." Professor Furukawa explains
that to Grotius, war instituted as "punishment" for a prior injury
wrought in violation of law is an aspect of "just war" theory, but it also
has deeper implications. An "equal" before the law has no authority to
punish an equal; the imposition of punishment implies superiority within
the system. Thus Grotius finds three categories of "punishment" justifiable: punishment that works to the advantage of the wrongdoer (reflecting Plato's view that wrongdoing is the result of the misuse of reason,
or poor education); punishment that redresses the wrong done to the victim; and punishment that protects the general social order and promotes
the good of mankind. All three categories reflect natural law assumptions and imply various natural law limits to the right to inflict punishment. Various additional limits are found in divine law. In sum, the
right to have recourse to force in order to "punish" a wrongdoer turns
out to be limited indeed, and the punishment is justified by factors other
than retribution, thus avoiding the pitfall of reprisals which would cause
escalation of conflict rather than peace.

6. Although Onuma notes Grotius's dependence on Cicero as the restater of Roman
conceptions of the binding nature of promises, he overlooked my favorite passage, where
Grotius directly criticized Cicero's assertion that promises to "pirata"are not binding. Grotius
points out that promises supported by oaths are indeed binding because the promise supported
by an oath is made to God, not to the pirates, and the promisor's soul is imperiled by bad
faith no matter who the beneficiary of the promise. See infra note 13.
7. My own research indicates the evolution of conceptions to have been well-established
by the time BP was written. The key transition period seems to have been in the early 16th
century, when the authority of the Pope as the principal exponent of divine law in preProtestant Europe was superseded by the secular authority of heads of state. See Alfred P.
Rubin, International Law in the Age of Columbus, 39(1) NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REV. 5
(1992) esp. 11-19.
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Grotius's views on the just causes of war having been analyzed in
the earlier chapters, Naoya (Okuwaki) Kasai (Professor of International
Law, Rikkyo University) addresses "The Laws of War" directly in
Chapter 8. While the jus ad bellum might not be satisfied by one or the
other party to an exchange of arms subject to the laws of war, the jus in
bello applies by definition. Scholastic and earlier philosophers had
difficulties in finding equal rights in both parties to the ongoing conflict
when they perceived unequal justice in their causes for fighting. Grotius
overcomes these difficulties by shifting from the scholastic focus on
natural law and divine law to customary law and the "law of nations."
Thus, he suggests that the victor in an "unjust" war should, of his own
volition, make reparation and return to the original owner any booty
captured during the war, on the ground that legality under the human
law does not imply legality under natural law or the moral values
reflected in that law. 8 Thus "internal justice," the moral law perceived
by introspection, requires restitution and postliminy even though the
human law of war might allow the victor to keep his spoils.
Grotius divides "war" into two parts: a reprisal or local war, and
"formal" or general war. It is a division that survives today. 9 An inconsistency appears between Grotius's views of the illegitimacy of Spanish
dominance in the Netherlands based upon the natural law under which
slavery is forbidden, and Grotius's defense of slavery as a legally justifiable result of capture in war. Grotius's argument in favor of slavery as a
result of war rests on slavery being, by natural law, a lesser evil than the
likely alternative, death. Although Professor Kasai does not go deeply
into the topic, I would suggest that Grotius's logic was more persuasive
to his European contemporaries than it would be to us. They knew of
the relations analogous to enslavement that accompanied Spanish and
Dutch activities in the New World and the Spice Islands.10
Chapter 9, "Temperamenta (Moderation)," is by Tadashi Tanaka, the
author also of Chapters 1, 2, and 4. The larger part of the chapter is
merely an expansion of the distinctions drawn in Chapter 8 between

8. A NORMATIVE APPROACH TO WAR, supra note 1, at 274.

9. In the United States, it was a division accepted by Chief Justice Marshall as soon as
the issue arose. See Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801): "[C]ongress may
authorize general hostilities, in which case the general laws of war apply to our situation; or
partial hostilities, in which case the laws of war, so far as they actually apply to our situation,
must be noticed."
10. On the Spanish practices and their legal rationales, well-known to Grotius and his
contemporaries, see Rubin, supra note 7, esp. pp. 32-35. On the Dutch activities in the Spice

Islands,

see ALFRED P. RUBIN, THE INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY OF THE MALAY PENINSULA: A STUDY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF IMPERIALISM 42-45, 55-59 and 65-93

(1974).
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what the positive law permits (including the fruits of victory in an
unjust war) and what the moral law and divine law permit, explaining
that "moderation" must be exercised even by fighters in a just cause,
lest they violate the natural law which requires it. Professor Tanaka
seems to lose his way slightly in this, identifying the natural moral
("internal") law with the law of nations in places, but reflecting what
might be obscurity in Grotius's own language read in isolation. The
chapter ends with Professor Tanaka suggesting (not entirely convincingly) that Grotius's notions of moderation with regard to captives in war
developed into the modem notion of the rights of prisoners of war." On
the other hand, Professor Tanaka is certainly correct in noting that
attempts to apply Grotian conclusions directly to the modern laws of
war are unconvincing, usually being mere arguments based on authority
usually taken out of context. He points out, for example, that attempts
after the First World War to abolish resort to force in international
affairs are not based on Grotian or scholastic "just war" ideas, but on
policy grounds.' 2
Chapter 10, "Agreements between Nations: Treaties and Good Faith
with Enemies," by Makoto Kimura (Professor of International Law,
Saitama University), deals with the fate of international promises in time
of war. The problem Grotius addressed was that 'fides," good faith, is
not a positive law obligation owed to enemies, nor was it universally
conceived in Christendom as a divine law obligation when dealing with
people of a different religion. 3 Nonetheless, he found a basis for the

11. In one passage Professor Tanaka says "it was not until 1929 that the protection
provided by the Geneva Convention was expanded to include prisoners of war. Until then,
prisoners of war were treated, at best, according to domestic instructions modelled after the
Hague Regulations of Land Warfare." A NORMATIVE APPROACH TO WAR, supra note 1, at
305. This is hard to reconcile not only with the language of articles 4-20 of the Hague
Regulations of 1899/1907 cited in the 1929 Convention, Convention Relating to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 47 Stat. 2021, 2061-62 (1929), but with cases such as the Union
Military Commission's conviction in 1865 for "murder in violation of the laws and customs
of war" of Captain Henry Wirz, the Confederate officer responsible for the notorious
Andersonville prisoner of war camp during the American Civil War.
12. A NORMATIVE APPROACH TO WAR, supra note 1, at 307.

13. Grotius actually finds a basis in divine law for a continuing obligation of good faith
between Christians and non-Christians, and, as pointed out in note 6 above, criticizes Cicero
for saying that a promise to "pirates" is not binding. The basis for obligation under divine law
is that a promise made in the form of an oath to God is binding between the promisor and
God whatever the bad faith of the beneficiary of the promise. See BP II, xiii, 15. For an
analysis of Cicero's political situation at the time he tried to free the political order of Rome
from its treaties with "pirata,"and the inapplicability of the Roman word to current conceptions of "piracy," see ALFRED P. RuBIN, THE LAW OF PIRACY 10-11, 54 n.50-54 (1988).
Professor Kimura's evidence for the assertion that "the Roman Church prohibited Christians
from entering into treaties with non-Christians, and denied their binding force" is two
twentieth century secondary works. A NORMATIVE APPROACH TO WAR, supra note 1, at 311.
No doubt some Christian publicists, and perhaps even the Church organization as a whole,
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continuing obligation of good faith in natural law, the source of the law
that makes (or does not make) treaties binding. Thus, to Grotius, treaties
are not a source of law, but are promises made binding by law; in
modem terms, the notion is similar to the assertion that treaties are a
source of obligation, not of law.' 4
Chapter 11, the conclusion by Professor Onuma, is worth the purchase of the entire book. It bluntly criticizes the tendency of many
modem scholars to attribute their own preferred meanings to texts
written in other times with other than modem situations in the mind of
the writer. Onuma finds the key to Grotius's normative approach to be a
"'secularized' natural law" that actually embraced many aspects of
Christian ethics that were presented as non-religious societal norms. 5 It
is an insight that will surely surprise many European scholars and others
of Christian or Jewish heritage, but is undoubtedly true. Onuma tackles
the gigantic figure of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht directly, finding many of
Sir Hersch's assertions regarding the "Grotian tradition," particularly
those relating to human rights and piercing the state veil to get at individual actors, to be "inappropriate in understanding Grotius."' 6 The
criticism is barely tempered with praise of Sir Hersch's assertion that
Grotius addressed ethics as part of statecraft and linked the notion of a
"universal moral code" to the notion of law. Reading Onuma's praise
carefully, and with knowledge of this volume's essays' meticulous

took that view from time to time over the millennia, but in light of flourishing Mediterranean
trade and even various armistice and other agreements during and after the Crusader period,
as well as the existence of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, the statement cannot possibly be true.
Indeed, for a compilation of treaties between the Christian princes of the northern Mediterranean and the Muslim authorities in the Maghreb, see M.L. DE MAS LATRIE, TRAIT9S DE PAIX
ET DE COMMERCE ET DOCUMENTS DIVERS CONCERNANT LES RELATIONS DES CHRiTIENS
AVEC LES ARABES DE L'AFRIQUE SEPTENTRIONALE AU MOYEN AGE (Burt

Franklin, no date)

(Paris 1866).
14. See Sir Gerald G. Fitzmaurice, Some Problems Regarding the Formal Sources of
International Law, in SYMBOLAE VERZIJL 153, 156 (1958). Professor Kimura does not
mention this evidence of the continuing vitality of the approach taken by Grotius, but does

strongly criticize Sir Hersch Lauterpacht's interpretation of BP (Hersch Lauterpacht, The
Grotian Tradition in InternationalLaw, 23 BR. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1946), reprintedin 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW:

BEING

THE COLLECTED

PAPERS OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT

307 (Elihu

Lauterpacht ed., 1975)), where, in his opinion, Sir Hersch attributes an excessively positivist
slant to Grotius's legal model. A NORMATIVE APPROACH TO WAR, supra note 1, at 314. In
my opinion, Lauterpacht's interpretation of Grotius has been very influential on the current
generation of scholars, but is mistaken in almost every way. See Alfred P. Rubin, Enforcing
the Rules of InternationalLaw, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 149, 149 n.1 (1993). The note making
the same point in rather stronger language appears also in the simultaneous publication of the
same article in FESTSKRIFT TILL JACOB W.F. SUNDBERG 267-83 (Juristffrlaget, Stockholm

1993).
15. A NORMATIVE APPROACH TO WAR, supra note 1, at 338-39.
16. Id. at 362. Lauterpacht's deeply influential essay that is the subject of Onuma's
criticism is that cited supra note 14.
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analysis of what Grotius actually wrote, it seems clear that Sir Hersch
was right only in a very limited way; to Grotius, morality was indeed
part of law, but only one part - divine law, positive law, and customary codes, such as chivalry, were also parts of "law" and would
remain "law" even if amoral. That is a far different model of the international legal order than the model urged on us by Sir Hersch. Onuma
concludes that the Grotian model of the international legal order does
not lie between "naturalists" and "positivists" as if combining the virtues
of both ends of a wide spectrum of jurisprudential thought, but rather
that the Grotian model recognizes discrete positions in that spectrum as
valid but incomplete. Thus, Onuma finds little or nothing significant in
the writings of Pufendorf that Grotius would have disagreed with, and
he finds misleading the conventional categorization of Pufendorf as the
first great modem "naturalist" as distinct from Grotius. The Lauterpacht
version of "Grotian" seems more "Pufendorfian" than Grotian, in that it
emphasizes the natural law end of the spectrum while Grotius distinguished among the various sources of law, attributing influence to each
and dominance to none in the overall system. Some readers might find
particularly useful the diagram on pages 342-43 of A Normative Approach to War of the many different categories of "law" referred to by
Grotius in BP as part of what today would be called the international
legal order. To my mind, Onuma's essay replaces Lauterpacht's as the
persuasive interpretation of Grotius for our time and possibly for generations to come.
In sum, this is a magnificent study, particularly useful for its
freedom from European biases, placing Grotius in historical and
jurisprudential context in a way that frees us from the burdens of
tendentious misinterpretations. It gives us a deeper appreciation of the
humanity, originality, good sense and perceptiveness that have made BP
a classic and preserved its author's name and reputation for almost four
centuries.

